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Civil-Military Relations 
Program in Guatemala: 




 The Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) was invited to offer 
a program in July 1997 to assist Guatemala in consolidating democratic 
civil-military relations.  By the end of 1998 the program had gone through 
four phases, and appears to have established a momentum in which 
discussion regarding the proper roles for civilians and military officials in 
a democracy is both legitimate and increasingly frequent.  In this short 
report I will describe the different phases of the program, discuss the 




 Guatemala has endured the same experiences of arbitrary military 
regimes and political violence as other Latin American countries, only 
more so.  Between at least 1966 and 1985, all governments were 
dominated by the armed forces, and the coup d'etat was the most common 
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mechanism for changing governments.  For example, when Vinicio Cerezo 
assumed the presidency in November 1985, he was only Guatemala's 
third civilian president since 1945.  And, between 1960 and 1996 the 
country was engaged in an armed insurrection, a virtual civil war.  During 
this period 140,000 people were killed, one million uprooted (out of a total 
population of 11 million), and the abuse of human rights, by both the 
government and the insurgent forces, was common.  Largely due to 
decisions and dynamics within the armed forces themselves, as each 
sector realized that they could never win the internal war militarily and 
through repression, the country gradually transitioned towards a 
democratic regime from the mid-1980s.  Even in the early 1990s, however, 
this regime was not consolidated as evidenced by the attempted auto-
coup of President Jorge Serrano in May of 1993.  That attempt was 
opposed by large sectors of the civil society, and not supported by the 
armed forces, indicating that progress had been made in the eight years 
since the end of the military regime.  Progress was also made by the 
armed forces and the governments after 1986, but particularly those of 
Ramiro de Leon Carpio, 1993 - 1996 and Alvaro Arzu, from January 1996 
until the present, in achieving a negotiated peace with the umbrella 
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guerrilla organization, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity 
(UNRG).  A central element in the peace agreement, signed on 29 
December 1996, was the stated goal of civilian control of the armed forces.  
By 1997, therefore, peace had been achieved, and the elected civilian 
government of President Arzu felt confident enough in power, and no 
longer confronted with the armed insurrection, to shake up the military 
high command. 
 There were of course many remaining problems including the 
serious socio-economic inequalities of the population, particularly that 
half which are indigenous peoples, a long and macabre backlog of deaths 
and abuses, and a wave of criminal violence.  And, since the country has 
enjoyed little civilian government in its history, but much internal 
violence, there were virtually no civilians with experience in dealing with 
security and defense who could assume responsibility in elected civilian 
governments.  Although the attempted coup in 1993 failed due to a lack of 
military support, this did not signify that the civilians controlled the 
military.  Indeed, all issues in the realm of the politics of civil-military 
relations, the relations of power between civilians and the military, had 
yet to be defined let alone resolved.  The challenge is to institutionalize the 
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structures and processes whereby democratically elected civilians control 
the armed forces as a part of the state, rather than the latter usurping the 
state itself.  These are precisely the issues that CCMR's programs are 
designed to address. 
 
Program 
 The program we are conducting with Guatemala is financed under 
what is termed Expanded-International Military Education and Training 
(E-IMET).  IMET was originally created for the U.S. armed forces to 
provide training and education to the armed forces of our allies to assist 
them in better fighting the common enemy, the Soviet Union and its allies, 
expressed or not.  At the end of the Cold War IMET was not only much 
reduced but also redefined, particularly under the Expanded version, to 
promote democratic civil-military relations, human rights, military justice, 
and resource allocation.  IMET is part of the State Department's 
appropriation but is administered by the Department of Defense, 
specifically the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).  This 
arrangement is designed to ensure that IMET fulfills U.S. foreign policy 
goals.  Further, the U.S. Congress plays a very active role in its utilization, 
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particularly in Central America.  Abroad, the IMET funds are managed by 
the U.S. Military Group (USMILGP), which is part of the embassy 
although not necessarily co-located with it.  
 A very important and unique characteristic in the Guatemala 
program is the cooperation between the MILGP and other sections of the 
embassy, particularly the Political and the Cultural sections.  This is 
particularly relevant since our programs always include civilians and 
military, as there is little merit in discussing and seeking to improve civil-
military relations unless both sectors are present and participating.  A 
problem in many countries is that while the MILGPS have close and 
ongoing contacts with the military, they normally have little to do with 
civilian sectors; that is simply not their job.  Through their close 
cooperation, initially the MILGP and the Political Section decided to invite 
the CCMR to offer a program in July 1997; the MILGP handled the 
invitations to the military and the Political Section met with and invited 
the civilians. This was critically important to the success of the program 
since, clearly for the civilians, there was absolutely no tradition in 
Guatemala of them dealing with security and defense.  To have been 
involved in these issues in the past would likely have invited attack, if not 
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from elements in the armed forces then from the guerrillas.  The Political 
Section thus had to identify those organizations and individuals that 
might be, or become, interested in issues of security and defense from the 
NGOs, think tanks, Congress, universities, and ministries such as Foreign 
Relations.  There could be no civilians from the Ministry of Defense as 
virtually everyone, from the Minister on down, are military officers.  The 
invitation for the military officers went from the MILGP to the Chief of the 
Defense Staff who requested that certain officers attend.  Logically the 
military would be interested in the topic of civil-military relations since 
theirs is a military career and, under a democratic regime, they will 
ultimately be responsible to the civilians. They thus have obvious reasons 
for knowing more about the general topic and meeting civilians.  With the 
civilians, as they have no background and are more diverse, the challenge 
is much greater as it is to identify and further interest these individuals 
who have no career in common nor, as yet, obvious employment 
opportunities in security and defense.  In sum, the civilian side of the 
nexus is most complicated and challenging as there is no cadre to begin 
with and no obvious immediate career role for them in security and 
defense.  This situation is not unique to Guatemala.  
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 The MILGP contacted the CCMR in early 1997 and asked us to put 
together a team and a program. We had several discussions with the 
MILGP and developed a one-week program on democratic civil-military 
relations.  The CCMR had by that time offered programs in more than a 
dozen countries in Asia, Africa, East and Central Europe, and Latin 
America, and this experience, combined with the scholarly work of 
members of the CCMR, suggested the central issues in a country seeking 
to institutionalize democratic civil-military relations.  It should be noted 
that civil-military relations is not a discipline per se.  Rather, it draws 
upon the disciplines of History, Political Science, and Sociology, and 
requires a good deal of first hand experience.  The final program included 
ten lecture blocks, mainly centered on the roles and responsibilities of 
civilians and officers in democracies.  These include such issues as the 
officer promotion process, civilian control of intelligence, responsibilities 
for defining roles and missions, the differing roles of militaries and the 
police, military roles in peacetime, and responsibilities in resource 
allocation.  We have also developed simulation exercises, which are 
designed to encourage civilians and military officers to discuss key issues 
in a country's security environment, to prioritize resources for defense and 
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other needs, and to allocate funds for different sectors within security and 
defense.  As is normal, the final program was about one third 
presentations by the instructors, one third discussion, and one third the 
simulation exercise.  The team assembled for the program included one 
academic with expertise in the region and topic, another with a Ph.D. and 
with extensive experience in policy making in the Department of Defense 
with regard to Latin America, a retired Navy Seal captain with a Masters 
degree in Political Science and long experience in Latin America, and a 
retired Navy rear admiral with extensive military experience as well as in 
management and in simulations.  The purposes in composing a team are 
to embody the expertise to cover the defined topics, to be able to respond 
to a wide variety of questions on all sorts of topics and relate these to civil-
military relations, and to have sufficient credibility,  to get the attention 
and respect of the participants.  The composition of this team was 
extremely effective.  The Center does not have one program or one team.  
One size does not fit all. Rather, the topics are defined according to each 
country and the needs at its particular stage of democratic consolidation, 
and the team is assembled accordingly.  The program is based on 
scholarly concepts and is integrated by an intellectual logic.  The team is 
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recruited to implement the program in situations that are always dynamic 
and quickly evolving.  
 The program was held at a hotel in Guatemala City, which was 
agreed upon as it was neutral turf.  There is a military facility nearby in 
the center of town, the old military academy, or Antigua Escuela 
Politecnica, with very good facilities, and it would have been free, but 
several of the civilians were unwilling to participate in a program at a 
military facility.  The participants were 20 officers, mainly majors and 
lieutenant colonels, and 22 civilians from seven NGOs, six think tanks, 
two universities, the Ministry of Foreign Relations, three political parties, 
one member of Congress, and one member of the UNRG.  Obviously, and 
intentionally with such a diverse group at the first program, the goal was 
to begin a dialogue.  Initially the civilians sat together as did the military 
officers, and regarded each other with apparent suspicion.  The program 
met daily from 8 AM until 4 PM, with a break for lunch on the premises.  
Before long the interaction became incredibly dynamic, not only in the 
four simulation groups, but in the lectures and discussion.  The overall 
theme was to provide information and insights whereby the participants 
would think about and discuss the roles and responsibilities of civilians 
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and officers in a democracy.  While examples from the U.S. were used, 
more general concepts were also provided and cases from other so-called 
“new” democracies.  The participants learned from the presentations and 
from each other, and by the end of the week they were working together 
as Guatemalans and not as civilians or military officers.  By all indications 
the program was a tremendous success.  In the end of course evaluations 
the participants reported that it was a great success and an indicator that 
several gave was the loyal attendance; 100% of the participants were 
present and participating 100% of the time. And this when they all had 
other jobs and tasks, and our program went eight hours a day.  The 
instructors were gratified that their work in preparing and presenting, 
with a large element of thinking on their feet, was well received.  We were 
also pleased to see how pragmatically the participants behaved.  The 
instructors tried to set this tone by frankly discussing some topics, 
including human rights and control of the intelligence apparatus, that 
have not only extreme sensitivity in Guatemala but also cause tensions in 
Guatemala and U.S. relations.  We left Guatemala with a sense of 
accomplishment, but did not at that point know what, if any, would be the 
next stage.  
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The Next Stage 
 One of the results of the program in July was that several of the 
civilians from the NGOs, think tanks, and universities began to meet and 
discuss how to keep the process initiated by the program going.  The 
program had served as a catalyst to legitimate their interest in the future 
of civil-military relations in Guatemala, provided them with some 
information and insights, and stimulated them to form a network, which 
also included several of the military officers.  In the Fall some of the 
civilians approached the embassy and asked if the U.S. government could 
assist them in institutionalizing in the universities the study and teaching 
of civil-military relations.  The embassy contacted the CCMR, and we 
proposed a three-phase program. 
 The first phase of this follow-on program was a one-week trip to 
Guatemala in January 1998 by two team members from July.  We wanted 
to identify how to implement a program in the universities and thus met 
with the rectors of the five universities and the director of the military 
academy, students from the civilian universities and the academy, 
representatives from the NGOs and think tanks, the Catholic Church, the 
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armed forces, and other informed or interested people.  All together there 
were 22 scheduled meetings with a total of 50 individuals.  Since this was 
the first time the CCMR had planned a program for the universities, and it 
was obviously the first time anything like this had been done in the 
Guatemalan universities, we all had much to learn.  The meetings at the 
universities were organized by the cultural attaché at the embassy.  At this 
stage, then, the program was supported by the MILGP, Political, and 
Cultural Sections.  We found that the impact from the first program was 
very positive.  Officers told us they stayed in contact with civilians they 
met at the program, members of NGOs told us that our techniques in 
teaching were being put to use throughout the country, and it was clear 
that the program had helped legitimate the study of and publishing on 
civil-military relations as an issue of politics in democratic consolidation.   
 The challenge at hand, however, of how to institutionalize the 
study and teaching on civil-military relations in the universities was not 
simple.  Those most interested in the topic were clearly the NGOs and 
think tanks, but they do not offer degrees.  The universities are very 
distinct as they have their own histories, bureaucratic priorities, and 
politics.  For example, the University of San Carlos, the public university, 
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was founded in 1676 and has 88,000 students.  The four private 
universities were all founded between 1961 and 1972, and have a total of 
33,000 students among them.  Of the four private universities two are 
religiously based and one is dogmatically free market oriented.  Through 
a series of meetings with the rectors at their universities, and then their 
representatives at the embassy, we decided that the most promising path 
was to encourage the rectors to identify the individuals they wanted to 
prepare to teach civil-military relations.  None of the universities had 
courses on this topic, and it was not clear where such a course, or 
components of such a course, would be located.  Again, it must be 
remembered that security and defense has been a monopoly of the armed 
forces.  In at least two cases the rectors were reticent to put their students 
in contact with students from some of the other universities.  When we 
met with the students, including the cadets at the military academy, they 
were eager to participate with students from other universities.  It should 
be noted that Guatemala, unlike El Salvador and Nicaragua for example, 
has a very rigorous process for recognizing new universities, and for this 
reason there are only five civilian universities (with two new ones now 
emerging) and the military academy.  The military academy does indeed 
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require an academic component in its program and the cadets graduate 
with a recognized university degree.  The five universities with their very 
different political/religious orientations draw their student bodies from 
different class and religious backgrounds.  It became obvious to us, as it is 
to them, that most adults in Guatemala have serious emotional scars from 
the generation of armed insurrection.  To some degree the universities, 
separated as they are into different orientations, perpetuate a divided 
society.  It is also clear to us that one has to focus on the younger 
generation, and particularly the future leaders who are in the universities 
and the military academy, to supersede the country's tragic and violent 
past.  In addition to investigating the feasibility of and establishing the 
bases of the next phase of the program, part of the agenda during the 
intense week in Guatemala was to promote the goals of the program in 
civil society, the government, and the military.  When one has the 
opportunity to meet with such a diverse group of influential individuals 
and organizations no moment should be lost in discussing the theme and 
content of civil-military relations in democratic consolidation.   
 The second phase was a one-week program at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in May for ten educators from the five universities 
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and the military academy.  Five of the educators occupied administrative 
positions and the other five were primarily faculty members with teaching 
responsibilities.  This program was the first the CCMR has ever offered on 
the teaching of civil-military relations and was intentionally broad and 
diverse.  We outlined twenty of the key civil-military relations topics and 
went into detail on five including the military as a profession, military 
roles and missions, the role of the budget in civil-military relations, and 
institutional frameworks for civil-military relations.  We showed them 
how we develop courses including use of the web, and even created a 
website for them on civil-military relations.  They attended courses on 
civil-military relations, one of our U.S. students who was completing his 
Masters thesis on Guatemala briefed them, a group of students told them 
about instruction and research from their perspectives, and we developed 
and worked through a simulation in defense decision-making.  Since U.S. 
faculty traditionally are not taught how to teach, it was a challenge to 
attempt to teach others how to teach.  In sum, they were involved with a 
great many faculty and students, and exposed to extensive course and 
research materials.  It became obvious again during the week how distinct 
the orientations of the different universities are in Guatemala.  It also 
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became obvious that several of the participants had not begun to think 
about how they would participate in future stages of the program.  Again, 
we were breaking new ground and were prepared to learn about the 
dynamics of the Guatemalan university system by doing this program 
with them.  The more we learned about their universities, and the 
structure of the Guatemalan university system, the better we could 
prepare for the next stage of the program. 
 The third stage of offering the course to university students in 
Guatemala was the culmination of the program, and was probably the 
most difficult.  It was difficult to organize and it was problematic to know 
how to achieve the desired level of student participation.  For that matter, 
and to be completely candid, we did not know what to anticipate in terms 
of student participation.  We used a rough estimate of between 50 and 60, 
but in fact did not know for sure how they would be identified and in 
what numbers.   
 In January 1998 we agreed in our last meeting with the 
representatives of the rectors that there would be two simultaneous 
courses over two weeks.  In this manner we would be able to attract both 
the students who had classes or worked in the afternoon as well as those 
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similarly occupied in the morning.  Each course would meet for three 
hours per day for nine days for a total of 27 hours.  It was the 
responsibility of the universities to identify the students, and we raised it 
as an issue with them, but it was never clear to us exactly how the 
different universities would in fact do this.  It later became obvious during 
the course that two universities and the military academy had a plan to 
select students whereas the other three institutions were more ad hoc.  
One university in fact did not send any students at all which was due in 
part to a conflict of scheduled examinations.   
 The difficulty in organizing the course itself was the challenge of 
who to involve to make the presentations.  As it worked out, a 
combination of participants from the first program in July of 1997 along 
with half of the faculty from the universities and the military academy 
who attended the course at NPS assumed responsibility for offering the 
two courses.  They divided up the tasks, in some cases using materials we 
provided and in other cases starting with completely new materials, but in 
all cases basing them on the types of concepts we use on democratic 
politics, the military as a profession, and the mutual responsibilities of 
both, and making the presentations relevant to Guatemala.  Only one 
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instructor from the Center for Civil-Military Relations participated, and 
his role was to act as a resource person, make one presentation, and 
introduce the four-stage simulation.  As one of what became defined as 
the core group had to travel abroad during the program, he invited 
another researcher to make a presentation who also did an excellent job.  
It is likely that he will now become part of the core group.  It should be 
noted that none of the instructors in this course received any financial 
compensation for their work.  In short, the Guatemalan university faculty 
and think tank researchers assumed responsibility for teaching the 
program.  They did it because they believe it is important for the future of 
their country.  
 The course took place under very adverse circumstances, which 
almost resulted in its cancellation before it began.  It started on the first 
Monday in November which was precisely the day that the remains from 
Hurricane Mitch caused very serious damage throughout Guatemala, 
including in the capital.  President Arzu declared a state of national 
calamity and instructed the population to stay home and away from work 
in order to keep the roads free for repairs and emergency relief.  We went 
to the Old Military Academy, where the course was to be held at 7:30 AM 
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and were prepared to delay the start of the course as we expected that few 
if any of the students would be present.  Instead we found 19 students 
ready and waiting for the course to begin, and so we began.  Later in the 
day as the extent of the devastation became known, the U.S. embassy 
canceled all events it was sponsoring in order to assist in the relief effort.  
The MILGP representative responsible for the course, however, convinced 
the ambassador to allow the course to continue.  The afternoon attendance 
was more spotty, since word of the national calamity and the request to 
stay off the streets was widely known, but we began that segment of the 
course as well.  Day by day, as the disaster situation became stabilized 
and the word about the course spread in the universities, the enrollment 
increased.  We kept daily attendance and by the end of the course there 
were sixty-three students who were awarded diplomas.  The diplomas 
were signed by the U.S. Ambassador, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and 
the Director of the Center for Civil-Military Relations. 
 The course dynamic was excellent.  The researchers and faculty 
members made their presentations on different aspects of democratic 
civil-military relations and the students debated and discussed with them 
and with each other.  It was clear that they had not been exposed to these 
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topics previously.  And in the case of students from some universities, 
they had never been encouraged to debate and discuss political issues.  
Their participation in the simulation was extremely active and productive.  
Indeed, they became so proficient at the simulation that at the end we not 
only asked them for results in terms of priorities for funding but also 
recommendations on new structures and processes.  We had never done 
that before, and the students did a superb job of it.  At the beginning of 
the course several of the military academy cadets noted that they had little 
or no contact with students in civilian universities, and several of the 
civilians reported that they had never had contact with the military.  By 
the end all of the students, military and civilian, were mixed and 
discussing actively with one another.  At the end of the course we had an 
open session to stimulate their comments and suggestions for the future, 
and also gave them an end-of-course evaluation.  The comments were 
very positive with good suggestions on how to institutionalize the process 
in the universities.  Probably the main lesson learned in this regard is to 
identify in each of the universities the organization, or individual, most 
likely to implement courses on civil-military relations.  We sought to deal 
with this issue by inviting to the graduation ceremony representatives 
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from universities.  Once we discussed with them this problem they agreed 
whether to handle future liaison themselves or indicate the individual in 
their institution who would.  We anticipate that the core group, from the 
think tanks and the universities, will maintain contact for the liaison 
function.   
 
Overall Lessons Learned and Ideas for the Future 
 In line with our overall goal in calling attention to the importance 
of civil-military relations and having it discussed, the MILGP invited a 
number of important figures to speak at a plenary session of the Friday of 
the first week.  Those who spoke included the Deputy Chief of Mission 
from the embassy (as the ambassador was overseeing U.S. support to the 
relief effort; for this same reason the Chief of Staff of the Army was unable 
to attend), a retired U.S. general who had been Commander of the U.S. 
Southern Command, a member of the professional staff of the U.S. House 
of Representatives, the Guatemalan Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, and 
the Director of the Guatemalan President's Office on Human Rights.  The 
students had already participated in presentations by the general and the 
Congressional staffer, and all of the students attended the plenary session 
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as did representatives from NGOs, the universities, and the military.  The 
high level representation was very useful to further highlight to the 
students the importance of the topics taught in the course, and for those 
presenting we know it was important (as they told us) in demonstrating 
the interest and enthusiasm of the civilian and military students. 
 Based upon our experience in four phases of the Guatemala 
program, the most obvious lesson learned is the keen interest in civil-
military relations.  Judging from the quantity and quality of participation 
by faculty, students, NGOs, military officers, etc. there is great awareness 
of the importance of civil-military relations for democratic consolidation 
and peace in Guatemala.  Our programs have provided the catalyst 
whereby the Guatemalan participants can have their interests legitimated, 
receive some new information, and obtain insights on how to deal with 
difficult political issues.  One of the most important insights is that civil-
military relations is about politics and thus about power.  In a democracy 
it is the popularly elected civilians who should have the power over the 
armed forces.  This concept appears to be new in Guatemala, as elsewhere, 
and there has been a tendency to confuse civil-military relations with civil 
affairs.  The latter is basically winning the hearts and minds of the 
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population, normally through infrastructure development, and does not 
deal with power.  The attention to politics is a real insight in Guatemala, 
and likely elsewhere.  The programs we have offered have also allowed 
the Guatemalans to establish networks, which include civilians from a 
variety of sectors as well as military officers.  We have found that several 
of those involved in these networks are now researching and writing on 
civil-military relations.  Exactly how courses in civil-military relations 
become institutionalized in the universities remains to be seen.  However, 
the experience in the course shows that the Guatemalans can indeed offer 
a high level course and the students who took it are likely to act as 
pressure groups to encourage adoption of courses or components of 
courses.  
 We did not begin this program in July of 1997 with any notion that 
it would lead to subsequent phases, let alone courses at the university 
level.  That it did is due to the responsiveness and requests of the 
Guatemalans and the willingness of the embassy, and particularly the 
MILGP, to respond to these requests.  There has been a great deal of work 
involved, particularly logistics and coordination, which has been handled 
by the MILGP and the core group of Guatemalans.  CCMR has been keen 
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to participate in the programs as it is both the right thing to do and 
encourages the center to continually develop and implement new 
programs.  We probably learn as much as the Guatemalans, and what we 
learn there we will apply elsewhere. 
Obviously, education is long term.  In the short term contacts with 
and programs for other sectors-NGOs, think tanks, members of political 
parties, senior military officers, members of congress, etc.-must also be 
promoted.  Establishing democratic civil-military relations is not only 
about structures and processes that can be identified in other democracies 
and possibly implemented in Guatemala.  It is also about beliefs and 
attitudes that support these structures and processes.  The latter take even 
longer to change than the former and our programs appear promising in 
their impact.  
 
